

SYNOPSIS: This dispatch contains the latest information learned on the CATIDE D/A case which Munich and [ ] have been attempting to monitor for the past several months. A summary of facts as now known follows: In September 1964 CATIDE asked for the use of a KUBARK audio listening transmitter device to be used to monitor a meeting of a CATIDE D/A with his opposition case officer. Although CATIDE was successful until very recently in hiding the true facts of the case from [ ] [ ], through the [ ] [ ], learned that the meetings took place in Copenhagen and that the opposition case officer was Josef LENSKY [ ] [ ] a Czech Intelligence Officer assigned to the Czech Embassy in Copenhagen. It also appeared from information passed by one CATIDE staffer to [ ] [ ] that the case had UJRANDOM aspects since the real suspect was allegedly the CATIDE case officer who handled the D/A being watched. It was the possible UJRANDOM aspects of the case that were of greatest interest to us as is attested by the previous traffic on the case. We have now learned through a slip on the part of a CATIDE staffer in Munich that the D/A is Hans Erich SCHOEBEL [ ] [ ]. The CATIDE case officer (at least in 1960) was, according our records, either Gerhard BARTKE [ ] [ ] or QHERMANN (true name unknown). There is nothing in the record, however, to indicate that either BARTKE or QHERMANN is an opposition penetration of CATIDE; we note that CATIDE traced

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*This dispatch overlooked by  
event and not sent out.*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

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BARTKE for a COSMIC clearance as recently as October 1964. As to the use of the audio device we loaned to CATIDE, they claim to have used it successfully at two meetings but information from [ ] indicates it was not used at the first meeting and our attempt to piggyback the operation at the second meeting came to naught. It now appears that future meetings will be held elsewhere and whether we will be able to elicit any further information from CATIDE and whether we will be able to determine whether the case actually has UJRANDOM aspects appears problematical at this point. We shall continue to do all we can to pin down the facts in the case and we hope that [ ] will also be able to come up with additional information.

1. Introduction: On 2 April 1965 we held a birthday luncheon for CATIDE's @MARWITZ; also present were @KUTZBACH and @MOLZEN from CATIDE. MLB was represented by [ ] and [ ]. As the party was breaking up KUTZBACH returned the audio device we had loaned CATIDE and [ ] took the opportunity to ask KUTZBACH how things had gone. [ ] and KUTZBACH stood to one side and it does not appear that MARWITZ or MOLZEN heard all that transpired since they were engaged in general conversation with [ ] [ ] asked how the device had worked and KUTZBACH said that it had done well but that CATIDE had been unable to develop sufficient evidence for their purposes. KUTZBACH said that the D/A had made the [ ] surveillance and had therefore reported all his movements very accurately to CATIDE. KUTZBACH referred to "our Danish friends" thus exposing the location of the meetings. KUTZBACH was of the opinion that the Danes might have purposefully allowed the surveillance to be noticed in order to get rid of a pesky case. [ ] asked whether KUTZBACH meant the Czech and KUTZBACH answered (almost under his breath) no, "GRAM". When [ ] asked, "How about the case officer", KUTZBACH replied that the Danes would not be able to get rid of "LENSKY" that easily. Thus it was in about three short statements that KUTZBACH gave us most of the key facts in the case. Since GRAM is the agent of CATIDE's Fall MONOGRAM, a case discussed in detail with MLB in the past, we had no trouble identifying the agent and from internal file evidence we determined that GRAM fitted in every respect the D/A in this particular case.

MLB Comment: The revelation of facts in this case both in Copenhagen and in Munich by CATIDE is a perfect example of how CATIDE should NOT conduct liaison. We have talked on the case to @PETERSEN, @SCHIRLING, @DOELLNER, @KASTELL, and @KUTZBACH and it appears that several different CATIDE staffers traveled to Copenhagen for discussions in connection with this case. We had discussed the case first with PETERSEN who went to great lengths to disguise the location and other aspects of the case (he actually contradicted himself in the process). The first time we were informed officially that the Czech Service was involved was on 8 February 1965 when @DOELLNER told [ ] that at the first meeting both Czech and German were spoken. DOELLNER was obviously not aware of how much PETERSEN had told us. Then KUTZBACH blew the case on 2 April because he had not participated in any previous discussions and had apparently not read any contact reports, assuming that PETERSEN and the others had written any. In KUTZBACH's defense it must be said that he had discussed the MONOGRAM case with MLB personnel in detail over a period of three years and may have assumed that no attempt had been made to disguise the facts from us. Whether KUTZBACH continues to give out information on the case will probably depend on whether his superiors become aware of the fact of what he did say and whether he is therefore instructed to say no more.

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2. Background and Highlights of MONGRAW Case: The central figure in the case is Hans Erich SCHOEEL ( ), born 5 February 1913 in Dresden, East Germany. SCHOEEL is a typesetter by trade and lives in Hamburg-Garstedt, Birkenweg 6, Telephone Number 579406. At what date SCHOEEL started working for the Czechs is not clear but it was apparently sometime before he was doubled by CAVATA. The case has been active since at least December 1958. Subject has a sister who is married to a Czech citizen and according to our latest information still resides in Prague. The sister is also considered to be a Czech agent. In July 1959 the case was turned over to CATIDE because it looked as if an approach could be made to SCHOEEL's Czech case officer who was stationed in East Berlin. Meetings were generally held in East Berlin in 1961 after which they were held in Zurich and Vienna. Among SCHOEEL's Czech targets over the years have been West German armed forces, the armament industry, political personalities and other rather general matters. He has also been used as a courier, been serviced-dead drops, has acted as an accommodation address, and has investigated selected individuals (presumably in the Hamburg area) for the CIS. At no time has SCHOEEL admitted informing the Czechs of his being doubled by CAVATA/CATIDE. CATIDE began discussing this case with MLB on 10 February 1960. Some of the highlights of the case resulting from discussions between CATIDE and MLB are outlined below:

a) CATIDE identified SCHOEEL to MLB on 31 March 1960.

b) On 24 May 1960 KUTZBACH stated that a graphological analysis of SCHOEEL's handwriting showed him to be completely untrustworthy.

c) On 31 March 1960 KUTZBACH also identified the CATIDE case officer handling SCHOEEL as V-1204: our records indicate V-1204 is Gerhard BARTKE ( ).

d) On 11 August 1960 KUTZBACH stated that SCHOEEL's case officer, who was considered by CATIDE to be a competent man, did not trust SCHOEEL but that no attempt had yet been made to test SCHOEEL.

e) On 1 September 1960 KUTZBACH said little progress was being made in the case and that the CIS appeared to be withdrawing. He admitted, however, that CATIDE was providing the agent deception material.

f) On 11 October 1960 KUTZBACH said that CATIDE was convinced that the agent was dishonest. CATIDE had run a surveillance on SCHOEEL in Hamburg and SCHOEEL had made a mysterious visit to a cemetery. When asked about it SCHOEEL denied he had ever been there. KUTZBACH was concerned because SCHOEEL apparently had no way to get in touch with the CIS. It was also at this time that KUTZBACH said that they hoped they could get SCHOEEL to arrange to meet his Czech case officer in Denmark.

g) In March 1961 it was reported that CATIDE had surveilled a meeting between SCHOEEL and a Czech case officer (a new one) in Zurich, Switzerland and that they had been able to determine that SCHOEEL was withholding information.

h) On 22 June 1961 Headquarters wrote (CGW-1085) that their review of the case made them doubt SCHOEEL's sincerity vis-a-vis CATIDE.

i) SCHOEEL visited East Berlin on 17/18 June 1961 and was instructed in radio and SW and received a new cover name. He was given a new Prague address as an accommodation address to use instead of that of his sister. (MHE Comment: This last was reported by CATIDE completely straight-faced as far as we can determine from the file. Although they knew all along he had a sister in Prague whom they strongly believed to be a CIS agent and although they also knew he was in correspondence with her, it apparently never occurred to CATIDE that she was his accommodation address -- see subparagraph (g) above.)

j) On 27 November 1961 immediately after the arrest of UJDROWSY, KUTZBACH stated that he was sure the case had been blown by UJDROWSY. The latter had no need to know about this case but KUTZBACH was certain that either he (KUTZBACH) or Dr. SCHREITER had told UJDROWSY about the case. KUTZBACH also noted that SCHOEEL was the first CATIDE D/A who had visited East Berlin after the wall was erected.

k) On 8 February 1962 KUTZBACH changed his position somewhat and said he thought there was a 60% chance UJDROWSY had not learned of the SCHOEEL case.

l) In 1962 and 1963 SCHOEEL began to have his meetings in Vienna. The last thing we had heard from KUTZBACH (late 1963) was that meetings would take place in the future in "some northern country".

m) Over the course of the period 1961-64 SCHOEEL was shown photographs of various CIS officers whom we had very good reason to believe were involved in the SCHOEEL case but in most instances he failed to come up with a positive identification.

n) CATIDE is on record as late as July 1964 that they were still in touch with SCHOEEL. They have never advised us of any conclusion of the case.

### 3. Key Questions to be Resolved:

a) Who was the CATIDE officer who told [ ] that the real target of their operation was the D/A's CATIDE case officer who was believed to be a recruited CIS agent and furthermore an individual about whom KUBARK had warned CATIDE years before? (ODCA 12606, 6 November 1964).

b) Did the story given by the CATIDE staffer to [ ] actually correspond with the facts in the case. The CATIDE staffer who made these statements was drunk at the time and there appears to have been no other hint that there was more to the case than a D/A whose bona fides was being checked. If a CATIDE staffer is the real target in this operation, who is he?

4. Comments on Paragraph 3 Above: (Although we realize, of course, that theorizing can be most dangerous in cases such as this, we present some of the possibilities below in the hope that they may in the final analysis provide us with additional facts.)

a) We had invited PETERSEN to attend a movie and to bring his subordinates on 15 October 1964. Only PETERSEN and DOELLNER were able to make it and we were informed that PETERSEN, KUTZBACH, and DR. MARETZ were out of town on a dry run with the audio device. It is possible that SCHREITER, the CATIDE technician who was briefed on the assignment by

[ ] of MKTOPAZ on 22 September 1961 was also in Copenhagen. It was presumably at this time that one of the CATIDE staffers drank too much and talked too much. At this point KUTZBACH appears to be the most likely candidate because he has full background knowledge on the case (34 meetings, etc) and has been in liaison with us (on this and other CE cases) longer than any of the others; he, therefore, was more likely to be aware of our having informed CATIDE about one of their own officers.

b) We are quite at a loss to determine just how much of the drunken CATIDE staffer's story was true. We can find nothing in our records to indicate that the CATIDE case officer, known to KUBARK as responsible for handling the case, was ever considered a security risk either by CATIDE or by KUBARK. In this connection we found a contradiction as to who SCHOEEL's CATIDE case officer actually is. According to the SCHOEEL file the case officer was V-1204 who is Gerhard BARTKE [ ] BARTKE lives in Hamburg and works out of CATIDE's Dienststelle 11 but his activity in the past has always been connected with positive operations directed against the Soviet Zone. In checking through the Dienststelle 11 file we learned that in 1961 SCHOEEL was run by Dienststelle 11 and that his case officer was @HERMANN. We have a carded reference to an @HERMANN who was believed to be working in Hamburg for Dienststelle 11 in 1958. He was described as being born about 1918, round face, scar at right temple, dark blond hair, 5'8" tall, 170 lbs., stocky figure, wore glasses. There was no V-number listed. We checked every @HERMANN for whom we could find a V-number but none of them fit the description of the one in Hamburg. The case may have been turned over to another Dienststelle after 1961 but this does not seem likely in view of SCHOEEL's residence in Hamburg. In view of our findings we believe that the drunken CATIDE staffer's story was even more garbled than it appeared on the surface and that SCHOEEL's CATIDE case officer is probably not the one under investigation.

c) In view of the evidence to date we can construct another theory for the story told by the drunken CATIDE staffer. If the staffer in question was indeed KUTZBACH it is almost certain that he was in a position to learn of KUBARK suspicions of both UJDREADFUL and @DR. SCHREITER. He may have wished to embellish a case that really was not so important and made up a story that was basically correct but one which had nothing to do with the SCHOEEL case. There is no evidence that UJDREADFUL ever had anything to do with the case, but @DR. SCHREITER did, especially in regard to the deception material given to the agent. It should be noted that there was no love lost between KUTZBACH and SCHREITER so that the former might not be adverse to telling a derogatory story about SCHREITER. At this point the case is being handled strictly within the CATIDE CE shop and we have heard nothing of it through @FLEMING. If this were really a @FRANZ case, we would expect FLEMING to take it over. Of course, it is always possible that CATIDE is conducting a @FRANZ investigation and is too embarrassed to talk to KUBARK about a man whom we suspected to be working for the other side. It is difficult to see, however, how the operation they just completed can contribute in any way to such an investigation. We will be grateful for any additional information [ ] can elicit from the [ ] or [ ] and we want to do what we can at this end to elicit more details.

APPROVED: [ ]

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